Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Crypto hardware wallet users under attack

Introduction 

A new attack campaign targeting users of cryptocurrency and specifically those using hardware wallets, is doing the rounds.

The attacker's end goal is to install ConnectWise's ScreenConnect, which is a legitimate remote-support application. ScreenConnect enables these attackers to take remote control of the device, execute commands, and steal any information they may find interesting. 

A simple visual representation of the attack flow can be observed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Attack flow

  

Brief analysis 

The following lure names and domains have been observed in this campaign:

Targeted service / brand Filename / artifact SHA-256 Associated domain / infrastructure
Coldcard v1.5.3Q-q1-coldcard.bat 13a340968f98b27eb4e39dd61f0b75822d68c8fbc35fa7f0ef791b65f87a8997 coldcard[.]pro
Coldcard v1.5.3Q-q1-coldcard.zip 190702a08dbb3b2c2b07b75876b6b88eec04f827070514b9ef387990fcce8b2b coldcard[.]pro
Ledger Ledger-wallet-Transition-Transcript.bat a6e49e8686488acbe8938da3726f8510ec58e638ee804b55fda43600c4f741a2 ledger-wallet[.]net
ledgeradvisorinfo[.]app
Ledger Ledger-wallet-Transition-Transcript.zip 52d7d663bb916e4cbf09fe0f3317d7ec379bf64cfa326b64e52cf75c0c71dd6e ledger-wallet[.]net
ledgeradvisorinfo[.]app
Pera Algorand Wallet Pera_Algorand_Wallet_v2.1.2.35.zip 1166831bf6ea477cf093b0f404b4a970c253062a91cfccef96c774522a7afa91 peraalgowallet[.]app
Pera Algorand Wallet Pera_Algorand_Wallet_v2.1.2.35.bat f7f646ce988f9af34075792805b786aea16a53d67c5cda5cbbe484f37b2fa1af peraalgowallet[.]app
Revolut revolut-taxfile.zip 633aec4539c4608fbb6cd19e596bc463c709761b04150cce8a4b0995702d51fa N/A
Revolut Revolut-taxfile.bat f7f646ce988f9af34075792805b786aea16a53d67c5cda5cbbe484f37b2fa1af N/A
ScreenConnect screenconnect.msi b3418cfb2a5b36682429b10443cd5333d19346fee83e8b85d7f6947b4ad3fa4a fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server
ScreenConnect screenconnect.exe 99f35301f179919706ce7c82379c37631d2d1cdab28a0b63cfa5044b20c06cad fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server
Xaman xamantaxfile.zip a311a02a982acf1a8bd61b87b79c9ac98e54827892f1caf126e09aba586dfabc N/A
ScreenConnect N/A ec874726bb4f58823a95674ceca60cb23cfa8546489b9b9d0382ae64bf2892f1 fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server

In this attack campaign, the ScreenConnect client service is configured to connect to fjksdjfdtitive[.]net on TCP port 8041. In addition, it also features the following connection parameters:

  • h= Remote host

  • s= Session identifier

  • e=Access

  • y=Guest

The login page behind fjksdjfdtitive[.]net allows the attacker to login and remote control any impacted device as seen in Figure 2 below.

 

Figure 2 - ScreenConnect login page

   

Removal / Disinfection

If you downloaded any of the ZIP files, and ran the BAT file inside, it is highly likely you have been affected by this campaign. Follow the steps below to verify if you have been infected and to remove ScreenConnect. 

1. Isolate first

  • Disconnect the device from Wi-Fi and/or Ethernet.

  • Avoid using the affected device for cryptocurrency wallets, banking, email, or anything else for the time being.

2. Block ScreenConnect domain and/or IP

If you have a firewall, or use any DNS filtering or software, or perhaps a proxy, block fjksdjfdtitive[.]net first and foremost from accessing the internet. Do the same for the IP  191.96.101[.]224. Note: remove the square brackets []. 

I recommend to block both the domain and IP address on the network level, if possible, so all your devices are protected. 

3. Review if impacted

Review Installed Apps or Programs and Features (installed software) for:

ScreenConnect Client (abb21f5ccc9bd236)

Note: the numbering may differ per ScreenConnect installation. Unless you actually use the software, consider any presence of ScreenConnect is a sign of compromise!

Investigate the associated Windows service and installation directory.

Relevant paths include:

C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (abb21f5ccc9bd236)\

Associated executables:

  • ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe

  • ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe

  • ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe

Review also if a service has been installed by opening services.msc and verifying if a ScreenConnect Client service has been installed. If so, stop and disable this service first before removing the above files and folder.

If none of the above are found, ensure to also review the %TEMP% folder for presence of any batch files (.bat) or a folder starting with the name sc_installer_.

If you do find any of the artifacts above, I highly recommend to reinstall Windows to ensure any traces are completely gone. Read how to do that here: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/experience/backup-recovery/reset-your-pc

If you cannot identify any of the above, then you are likely not impacted. However, if you did open / run a suspicious ZIP and/or BAT (batch) file, I recommend to perform a full system scan with your installed antivirus/antimalware, as well as another one, for example MalwareBytes.

4. Reset credentials

If impacted, from a separate and clean device do the following, in parallel with the above:

  • Reset email credentials.

  • Change password-manager credentials.

  • Reset cryptocurrency exchange passwords.

  • Revoke any active sessions and potentially API keys (after resetting passwords and logging in from a known clean / safe device).

    In addition, review and revoke suspicious token approvals.
     

Any locally stored wallet data may also have been exposed, as well as other sensitive data. 

5. Additional precautions

Since it's always better to be safe than sorry, the following general advice may assist if you suspect a cryptocurrency wallet has been exposed:

  1. Stop using the compromised computer for wallet operations.

  2. If a recovery phrase or private key may have been exposed, treat the wallet as compromised.

  3. Generate a new wallet using a clean device and a new recovery phrase.

  4. Move remaining assets to the new wallet. Note this may incur a cost.

  5. Verify destination addresses directly on the hardware-wallet display.

  6. Review and revoke suspicious token approvals. If the wallet interacted with a suspicious dApp or signed an unknown approval, revoke allowances on the relevant chain. Disconnecting a dApp alone does not revoke token permissions.

  7. Secure associated cryptocurrency exchange accounts. (e.g. ensure MFA is enabled, ...)

Never provide a recovery phrase to anyone claiming to offer technical support, wallet recovery services, or anyone else for that matter.

I also recommend to contact the Crypto Exchange to report what happened as well as to rotate credentials, revoke accesses and review potential suspicious transactions as mentioned above. 

Conclusion

Cryptocurrency users have increasingly been in the crosshairs of attackers. As always, ensure you take the necessary security precautions, for example by following the recommendations from your hardware wallet provider, the cryptocurrency exchange, as well as any other best practices when using crypto.

The best recommendation is to better be safe than sorry - and if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is! 

If you have any questions, feedback or comments or you suspect you have been infected, feel free to let me know via a comment below or on Twitter / X. 

 

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators can be found earlier on in this blog post, with a complete version on LevelBlue OTX (AlienVault OTX) here: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6afba3a4742087ffc54fc81e/ 

These indicators can be used to perform further blocks or further identify any sign of compromise. 

MITRE Mapping

MITRE ATT&CK ID Technique Description / campaign relevance
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Batch files are used to execute commands and launch subsequent stages of the infection chain.
T1059.001 PowerShell PowerShell is used to start processes, bypass execution policy, and launch commands in a hidden window.
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer ScreenConnect installer files are downloaded or staged on the affected system.
T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software ScreenConnect is deployed to provide remote access to compromised devices.
T1543.003 Windows Service The ScreenConnect client is installed as a Windows service.
T1571 Non-Standard Port The ScreenConnect client communicates with its remote host over TCP port 8041.
T1497.001 System Checks Relevant where the malware performs checks for virtualisation or sandbox environments; retain this mapping only if supported by the sample analysis.
S0591 ConnectWise MITRE ATT&CK software entry for ConnectWise, which includes ScreenConnect, the legitimate remote-access software abused in this campaign.

Wednesday, November 19, 2025

Autumn Dragon: China-nexus APT Group Targets South East Asia

In this report, we describe how we tracked for several months a sustained espionage campaign against the government, media, and news sectors in several countries including Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia.


Since early 2025, China’s involvement in the Indo-Pacific has been more prolific, from escalating maritime tensions, to being peacebroker in Myanmar’s military junta and more recently, espionage activities on joint exercises the Philippines naval forces have been conducting together with the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

The attacker, which we believe is a China-nexus threat actor, showcases a love of DLL sideloading techniques in order to compromise their targets of interest. Governments and media are high-value targets because they shape policy, public opinion, and international alignment.

The report details the full attack chain of one particular compromise we discovered, and goes further into detail on victimology, other campaigns and finally lists indicators of compromise.

 Link to the report: https://cyberarmor.tech/blog/autumn-dragon-china-nexus-apt-group-targets-south-east-asia 

Monday, October 27, 2025

Earth Estries alive and kicking

Earth Estries, also known as Salt Typhoon and a few other names, is a China-nexus APT actor, and is known to have used multiple implants such as Snappybee (Deed RAT), ShadowPad, and several more.

In their latest campaign, the actor leverages one of the latest WinRAR vulnerabilities that will ultimately lead to running shellcode.

The execution flow is as follows:

A screenshot of a computer

AI-generated content may be incorrect.


That is all. Find below indicators of compromise and Yara rules.

Indicator Type Purpose
f8c119bfc057dc027e6c54b966d168ee1ef38c790e581fb44cf965ca0408db1d SHA256 Hash CAB file storing ccwkrlib.dll
94aa6619c61d434e96ca8d128731eb7ee81e399a59a17f751a31b564a7f3a722 SHA256 Hash Encrypted stub
3c84a5255e0c08e96278dea9021e52c276b4a6c73af9fa81520aefb4a8040a8b SHA256 Hash CAB file storing RES.RC
3822207529127eb7bdf2abc41073f6bbe4cd6e9b95d78b6d7dd04f42d643d2c3 SHA256 Hash Dropper
64ca55137ba9fc5d005304bea5adf804b045ec10c940f6c633ffde43bc36ff3f SHA256 Hash Fake PDF with ADS stream
6c6af015e0bfec69f7867f8c957958aa25a13443df1de26fa88d56a240bdd5ad SHA256 Hash Hijacked DLL, bloated
5e062fee5b8ff41b7dd0824f0b93467359ad849ecf47312e62c9501b4096ccda SHA256 Hash Hijacked DLL
3b47df790abb4eb3ac570b50bf96bb1943d4b46851430ebf3fc36f645061491b SHA256 Hash Downloads CommonSDK.exe
ccwkrlib.dll Filename Hijacked DLL
RES.RC Filename Encrypted stub
CommonSDK.exe Filename Fake PDF with ADS stream
doc20250921133625.pdf Filename Fake PDF with ADS stream
startup.bat Filename Downloads CommonSDK.exe
WindowsTarys Filename Scheduled task
38[.]54[.]105[.]114 IP Address Download server
mimosa[.]gleeze[.]com Domain C2 Server

 

Associated Yara rules are available on my Github: 

https://github.com/bartblaze/Yara-rules 

Rule names:

  • EE_Loader 
  • EE_Dropper 
  • WinRAR_ADS_Traversal

References / Resources:

WinRAR CVE:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8088

https://www.welivesecurity.com/en/eset-research/update-winrar-tools-now-romcom-and-others-exploiting-zero-day-vulnerability/


Earth Estries:

https://jsac.jpcert.or.jp/archive/2025/pdf/JSAC2025_1_5_leon-chang_theo-chen_en.pdf 

https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/j/premier-pass-as-a-service.html  

https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/earth_estries 

https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/ghostemperor

Friday, June 20, 2025

Steam Phishing: popular as ever

A month or so ago a friend of mine received the following message on Steam from someone in their Friends list (they were already friends):

Figure 1 - 'this is for you'           


 

 

 

 

 

The two links are different and refer to a Gift Card on Steam's community platform. As you might have noticed, the domain is not related to Steam at all, but rather is an attempt at phishing.

 The URLs are:

stermcormmunity[.]com/gift-card/
steamcoummuniity[.]com/gift-card/

The differences are subtle enough that you may just miss it. When you click on the link, you are redirected to a 'Summer Gift Marathon'.

Figure 2 - Fake Steam website


Once you log in to the fake Steam website, your credentials are stolen and will be used to spread more phishing, likely steal your inventory items and so on.

Other phishing sites related to this campaign are:

steam-pubgvn[.]top
steamauthconnection[.]store
steamcommnunity[.]com
steamcommunitay[.]com
steamcommunitfy[.]com
steamcommunitihy[.]icu
steamcommunitiny[.]com
steamcommunitweya[.]art
steamcommunl1ty[.]com
steamcommunllity[.]com
steamcommunty[.]ru
steamcommununity[.]cam
steamcommunutiy[.]com
steamcomnunityty[.]com
steamcomnunlity[.]com
steamcomnuty[.]com
steamcomrnnunlty[.]com
steamcomun1ty[.]com
steamcomuniry[.]com
steamconmunify[.]com
steamconnection[.]store
steamcornmunlty[.]ru
steamcornrnunlty[.]ru
steamlinks-short[.]com
stearncommunjty[.]com
stearncommunnity[.]com
stearncomnunity[.]com
stearncornnunity[.]com
steeamcommunitty[.]com
unevwsteeamcommunitty[.]com 

New ones do pop up from time to time, so stay vigilant. 

Tips  

Only log in on the legitimate Steam community website, this being https://steamcommunity.com/. An extra tip is to bookmark the legitimate site, so even if you do get a message like this, you can go straight to your bookmark and search what you need from there.
 
If someone new tries to add you as a Friend and immediately sends a message like the above, alarm bells should start ringing.
 
If someone already on your Friends list suddenly sends a random message with an even more random link out of the blue, cue the alarm bells again. 
 
If you want to check the website out in a safe manner, then you can use URLscan.io, which will give you a verdict of the website as well as an image preview. In addition, you can use VirusTotal to review a website's reputation.
 
Note that an 'all clean' does not necessarily mean it is. Caution above all! 
 
Follow Steam's Account Security Recommendations to stay safe.

 

 

Wednesday, August 14, 2024

Microsoft Word and Sandboxes

Today's post is a brief one on some Microsoft Word and sandbox detection / discovery / fun.

Collect user name from Microsoft Office

Most sandboxes will trigger somehow or something if a tool or malware tries to collect system information or user information. But what if we collect the user name via the registry and more specifically, what user info Microsoft Office sees?

This information is stored in the Current User hive, Software\Microsoft\Office\Common\UserInfo.

10-second code and we can whip up:
 
 
 
 
Text form:

$userName = (Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Office\Common\UserInfo").UserName

Start-Process -FilePath "notepad.exe" -ArgumentList $userName
 
And we get something like:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and the process tree:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some sandboxes had a username of "Admin", "admin" or a completely random name. 
 
In short, it's a potential technique for more stealth reconaissance that may not trigger a sandbox or detection mechanism.


Run a Microsoft Word doc with.. .asd extension

When Microsoft Word crashes, it will (usually) attempt to create a backup copy of all your opened documents. It typically saves these backups as .wbk (Word Backup) or .asd (Autosave or Autorecover) files.

These will be saved in one of these directories in normal circumstances:
  • C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Word
  • C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word
  • C:\Users\USERNAME\AppData\Local\Temp
  • C:\Users\USERNAME\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\UnsavedFiles

Most sandboxes however will be able to open the file just fine, but not all...:







 

 

 

 

I haven't seen much use of actual .asd files, likely as the documents will need to be loaded from one of the above directories, however... after crafting your malicious document, you can simply rename it from badfile.docx to badfile.asd, and it will run fine.

It seems at least 1 actor has used an .asd extension before, as reported on by Didier Stevens:

https://isc.sans.edu/diary/CrowdStrike+Outage+Themed+Maldoc/31116

In short, it's another way of evading sandboxes or other potential detection mechanisms that may not support these .asd or .wbk extensions or even consider them harmless.