Tuesday, November 17, 2026

Crypto hardware wallet users under attack

Introduction 

A new attack campaign targeting users of cryptocurrency and specifically those using hardware wallets, is doing the rounds.

The attacker's end goal is to install ConnectWise's ScreenConnect, which is a legitimate remote-support application. ScreenConnect enables these attackers to take remote control of the device, execute commands, and steal any information they may find interesting. 

A simple visual representation of the attack flow can be observed in Figure 1.

Figure 1 - Attack flow

  

Brief analysis 

The following lure names and domains have been observed in this campaign:

Targeted service / brand Filename / artifact SHA-256 Associated domain / infrastructure
Coldcard v1.5.3Q-q1-coldcard.bat 13a340968f98b27eb4e39dd61f0b75822d68c8fbc35fa7f0ef791b65f87a8997 coldcard[.]pro
Coldcard v1.5.3Q-q1-coldcard.zip 190702a08dbb3b2c2b07b75876b6b88eec04f827070514b9ef387990fcce8b2b coldcard[.]pro
Ledger Ledger-wallet-Transition-Transcript.bat a6e49e8686488acbe8938da3726f8510ec58e638ee804b55fda43600c4f741a2 ledger-wallet[.]net
ledgeradvisorinfo[.]app
Ledger Ledger-wallet-Transition-Transcript.zip 52d7d663bb916e4cbf09fe0f3317d7ec379bf64cfa326b64e52cf75c0c71dd6e ledger-wallet[.]net
ledgeradvisorinfo[.]app
Pera Algorand Wallet Pera_Algorand_Wallet_v2.1.2.35.zip 1166831bf6ea477cf093b0f404b4a970c253062a91cfccef96c774522a7afa91 peraalgowallet[.]app
Pera Algorand Wallet Pera_Algorand_Wallet_v2.1.2.35.bat f7f646ce988f9af34075792805b786aea16a53d67c5cda5cbbe484f37b2fa1af peraalgowallet[.]app
Revolut revolut-taxfile.zip 633aec4539c4608fbb6cd19e596bc463c709761b04150cce8a4b0995702d51fa N/A
Revolut Revolut-taxfile.bat f7f646ce988f9af34075792805b786aea16a53d67c5cda5cbbe484f37b2fa1af N/A
ScreenConnect screenconnect.msi b3418cfb2a5b36682429b10443cd5333d19346fee83e8b85d7f6947b4ad3fa4a fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server
ScreenConnect screenconnect.exe 99f35301f179919706ce7c82379c37631d2d1cdab28a0b63cfa5044b20c06cad fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server
Xaman xamantaxfile.zip a311a02a982acf1a8bd61b87b79c9ac98e54827892f1caf126e09aba586dfabc N/A
ScreenConnect N/A ec874726bb4f58823a95674ceca60cb23cfa8546489b9b9d0382ae64bf2892f1 fjksdjfdtitive[.]net
Remote-access server

In this attack campaign, the ScreenConnect client service is configured to connect to fjksdjfdtitive[.]net on TCP port 8041. In addition, it also features the following connection parameters:

  • h= Remote host

  • s= Session identifier

  • e=Access

  • y=Guest

The login page behind fjksdjfdtitive[.]net allows the attacker to login and remote control any impacted device as seen in Figure 2 below.

 

Figure 2 - ScreenConnect login page

   

Removal / Disinfection

If you downloaded any of the ZIP files, and ran the BAT file inside, it is highly likely you have been affected by this campaign. Follow the steps below to verify if you have been infected and to remove ScreenConnect. 

1. Isolate first

  • Disconnect the device from Wi-Fi and/or Ethernet.

  • Avoid using the affected device for cryptocurrency wallets, banking, email, or anything else for the time being.

2. Block ScreenConnect domain and/or IP

If you have a firewall, or use any DNS filtering or software, or perhaps a proxy, block fjksdjfdtitive[.]net first and foremost from accessing the internet. Do the same for the IP  191.96.101[.]224. Note: remove the square brackets []. 

I recommend to block both the domain and IP address on the network level, if possible, so all your devices are protected. 

3. Review if impacted

Review Installed Apps or Programs and Features (installed software) for:

ScreenConnect Client (abb21f5ccc9bd236)

Note: the numbering may differ per ScreenConnect installation. Unless you actually use the software, consider any presence of ScreenConnect is a sign of compromise!

Investigate the associated Windows service and installation directory.

Relevant paths include:

C:\Program Files (x86)\ScreenConnect Client (abb21f5ccc9bd236)\

Associated executables:

  • ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe

  • ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe

  • ScreenConnect.WindowsBackstageShell.exe

Review also if a service has been installed by opening services.msc and verifying if a ScreenConnect Client service has been installed. If so, stop and disable this service first before removing the above files and folder.

If none of the above are found, ensure to also review the %TEMP% folder for presence of any batch files (.bat) or a folder starting with the name sc_installer_.

If you do find any of the artifacts above, I highly recommend to reinstall Windows to ensure any traces are completely gone. Read how to do that here: https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/experience/backup-recovery/reset-your-pc

If you cannot identify any of the above, then you are likely not impacted. However, if you did open / run a suspicious ZIP and/or BAT (batch) file, I recommend to perform a full system scan with your installed antivirus/antimalware, as well as another one, for example MalwareBytes.

4. Reset credentials

If impacted, from a separate and clean device do the following, in parallel with the above:

  • Reset email credentials.

  • Change password-manager credentials.

  • Reset cryptocurrency exchange passwords.

  • Revoke any active sessions and potentially API keys (after resetting passwords and logging in from a known clean / safe device).

    In addition, review and revoke suspicious token approvals.
     

Any locally stored wallet data may also have been exposed, as well as other sensitive data. 

5. Additional precautions

Since it's always better to be safe than sorry, the following general advice may assist if you suspect a cryptocurrency wallet has been exposed:

  1. Stop using the compromised computer for wallet operations.

  2. If a recovery phrase or private key may have been exposed, treat the wallet as compromised.

  3. Generate a new wallet using a clean device and a new recovery phrase.

  4. Move remaining assets to the new wallet. Note this may incur a cost.

  5. Verify destination addresses directly on the hardware-wallet display.

  6. Review and revoke suspicious token approvals. If the wallet interacted with a suspicious dApp or signed an unknown approval, revoke allowances on the relevant chain. Disconnecting a dApp alone does not revoke token permissions.

  7. Secure associated cryptocurrency exchange accounts. (e.g. ensure MFA is enabled, ...)

Never provide a recovery phrase to anyone claiming to offer technical support, wallet recovery services, or anyone else for that matter.

I also recommend to contact the Crypto Exchange to report what happened as well as to rotate credentials, revoke accesses and review potential suspicious transactions as mentioned above. 

Conclusion

Cryptocurrency users have increasingly been in the crosshairs of attackers. As always, ensure you take the necessary security precautions, for example by following the recommendations from your hardware wallet provider, the cryptocurrency exchange, as well as any other best practices when using crypto.

The best recommendation is to better be safe than sorry - and if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is! 

If you have any questions, feedback or comments or you suspect you have been infected, feel free to let me know via a comment below or on Twitter / X. 

 

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Indicators can be found earlier on in this blog post, with a complete version on LevelBlue OTX (AlienVault OTX) here: https://otx.alienvault.com/pulse/6afba3a4742087ffc54fc81e/ 

These indicators can be used to perform further blocks or further identify any sign of compromise. 

MITRE Mapping

MITRE ATT&CK ID Technique Description / campaign relevance
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Batch files are used to execute commands and launch subsequent stages of the infection chain.
T1059.001 PowerShell PowerShell is used to start processes, bypass execution policy, and launch commands in a hidden window.
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer ScreenConnect installer files are downloaded or staged on the affected system.
T1219.002 Remote Desktop Software ScreenConnect is deployed to provide remote access to compromised devices.
T1543.003 Windows Service The ScreenConnect client is installed as a Windows service.
T1571 Non-Standard Port The ScreenConnect client communicates with its remote host over TCP port 8041.
T1497.001 System Checks Relevant where the malware performs checks for virtualisation or sandbox environments; retain this mapping only if supported by the sample analysis.
S0591 ConnectWise MITRE ATT&CK software entry for ConnectWise, which includes ScreenConnect, the legitimate remote-access software abused in this campaign.